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The Achilles’ heel of welfare state
legitimacy: perceptions of overuse
and underuse of social benefits
in Europe
Femke Roosma, Wim van Oorschot and John Gelissen
ABSTRACT When analysing the legitimacy of the welfare state, perceptions of the
overuse and underuse of welfare are of great importance. Previous literature suggests
that many people perceive overuse (misuse or fraud), and there is evidence that
people also perceive underuse (non-take-up) of welfare benefits. Perceptions of
overuse have therefore been called ‘the Achilles’ heel of welfare state legitimacy’.
We analyse data from the European Social Survey for 25 countries and investigate
the occurrence and the individual and contextual determinants of overuse and under-
use perceptions. We find that both overuse and underuse perceptions are prevalent in
all European countries. However, whereas overuse perceptions are more related to
ideology, collective images of welfare recipients and selective welfare regimes, under-
use perceptions are more shaped by self-interest and the levels of unemployment and
social spending in a country. Instead of one Achilles’ heel, welfare state legitimacy
seems to have two weak spots.
KEY WORDS Benefit abuse; European Social Survey; non-take-up; welfare
attitudes; welfare states.
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the economic downturn following the oil crisis of 1979, there have been
fundamental debates about the necessity of welfare state retrenchment or reform
(Taylor-Gooby 2004). Parallel to these debates, scholars have discussed whether
welfare states implementing substantial retrenchment of social provisions could
still rely on full public support. Although some scholars in this context even have
predicted ‘the end of the welfare state’ (Svallfors and Taylor-Gooby 1999),
empirical studies have concluded that popular support for a strong role of the
welfare state and extensive social spending is invariably high across Europe
(see, for instance, Gelissen [2000]; Meier Jaeger [2006]). However, the legiti-
macy of the welfare state depends not only on such support for the role and
social spending of the welfare state. Rothstein (1998) argues that there are
three conditions for welfare legitimacy. In addition to support for goals and pro-
grammes (substantive justice), people also need to believe that contributions
# 2015 Taylor & Francis
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(taxes) to the welfare state are distributed fairly (redistributional justice). Further-
more, people need to believe that these welfare policies are implemented in an
efficient (with low administrative costs) and effective (with no welfare fraud)
way (procedural justice) (Rothstein 1998). Studies examining support for the
latter two conditions have invariably shown that the European public is very
critical with respect to procedural justice: people tend to perceive rather high
degrees of bureaucracy and low efficiency in their welfare states (Roosma
et al. 2013; Sihvo and Uusitalo 1995a; Van Oorschot and Meuleman 2011).
More specifically, these studies have concluded that people are most critical
of the mis-targeting of welfare benefits in terms of the overuse (abuse) of benefits
and underuse (non-take-up) of benefits (Becker 2005; Edlund 1999; Ervasti
1998, 2012; Goul Andersen 1999; Halvorsen 2002; Svallfors 1991). Not
without reason, mis-targeting of welfare benefits has been called ‘the Achilles’
heel of welfare state legitimacy’ (Goul Andersen 1999: 20).
The relevance of perceptions of welfare overuse and welfare underuse for
welfare state legitimacy might even increase now that public debates about
the welfare state increasingly place welfare beneficiaries in the spotlight and
discuss whether people are taking advantage of the welfare system (Larsen
2002; MacDonald et al. 2014; Sage 2012). Discussions about increasing job-
seeking obligations for welfare beneficiaries are high on the agenda, and cheating
and welfare fraud are frequently and easily exposed in the media (Bullock et al.
2001; Clawson and Trice 2000).
However, although perceptions about the mis-targeting of benefits are such
an important condition for welfare state legitimacy, we know little about
perceptions of welfare overuse and even less about perceptions of welfare under-
use. The few previous empirical studies examining perceptions of overuse and
underuse of benefits did not extensively analyse cross-national differences in
perceptions and did not elaborate on the individual- or contextual-level deter-
minants; hence, it is not well understood which factors cause people in some
countries to perceive more mis-targeting than other people in other countries.
In this article, we thoroughly analyse the cross-national perceptions of both
the overuse and underuse of social benefits in European welfare states. We for-
mulate two research questions: (1) How does the European public perceive the
overuse and underuse of welfare benefits? (2) Which individual and contextual
characteristics influence the differences in European perceptions of the overuse
and underuse of welfare benefits?
2. PERCEPTIONS OF MISTARGETING OF WELFARE BENEFITS
Mis-targeting of benefits occurs (1) when people who are formally considered to
be deserving of or eligible for benefits do not receive those benefits (underuse) or
(2) when people who are not formally deserving or eligible are receiving these
benefits (overuse) (Van Oorschot 2001). The underuse or non-take-up of
benefits can be unintentional, e.g., resulting from ignorance of social rights,
or intentional, e.g., when a benefit is not claimed for fear of stigmatization. If
2 Journal of European Public Policy
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the overuse of benefits is intentional, then the term welfare fraud or abuse is
used, whereas if overuse is unintentional, it may be called unintended overuse
or misuse. Previous empirical studies have largely focused on perceptions of
benefit overuse and have found that large proportions of populations perceive
the overuse of welfare benefits (Ervasti 1998, 2012; Goul Andersen 1999;
Halvorsen 2002). In studies analysing attitudes toward a broad range of
welfare dimensions, perceived overuse often stands in stark contrast to the
largely positive perceptions of social programmes and social rights (Roosma
et al. 2013; Sihvo and Uusitalo 1995a; Svallfors 1991; Van Oorschot and
Meuleman 2011;). Moreover, in studies analysing overuse as part of other
critical welfare attitudes, such as the bureaucracy of the welfare state,
overuse is often regarded as the most problematic issue by the public (Ervasti
1998, 2012; Goul Andersen 1999; Halvorsen 2002). However, studies
have devoted less attention to the tendency of European people to perceive
relatively large degrees of underuse of social benefits (Ervasti 2012; Roosma
et al. 2013).
2.1. Individual-level explanations of overuse and underuse perceptions
Previous studies that relate attitudes towards overuse and underuse to various
individual-level covariates find a prominent effect of political orientation:
people with a right-wing political preference perceive higher overuse and
lower underuse (Ervasti 1998, 2012; Halvorsen 2002; Sihvo and Uusitalo
1995a; Van Oorschot and Meuleman 2011). Education also seems to be a
rather stable explanatory factor of overuse and underuse perceptions, as
higher education reduces both overuse and underuse perceptions (Ervasti
1998, 2012; Halvorsen 2002; Sihvo and Uusitalo 1995a; Van Oorschot and
Meuleman 2011). Most studies find a positive effect of income on overuse per-
ceptions, although Ervasti (2012) reports a small negative effect. What the
studies mentioned have in common is that they reveal the empirical relationship
between some rather ad hoc chosen individual characteristics and perceptions of
overuse and underuse, but they do not explicitly test theories by formulating
hypotheses. In particular, perceptions of underuse are not examined in great
detail because they are considered in studies that focus on multiple welfare atti-
tudes (Ervasti 2012; Sihvo and Uusitalo 1995a; Van Oorschot and Meuleman
2011). Below, we propose our theoretical expectations for the individual factors
that influence overuse and underuse perceptions, and we formulate three
hypotheses.
In the welfare attitude literature, two main factors are identified as crucial
determinants of welfare state attitudes. These factors relate to the classic theories
that predict human action to be inspired either by self-interest (homo econom-
icus) or by social norms or ideological desires for the common good (homo socio-
logicus) (Kangas 1997). As previous research has shown, both factors play a role
in shaping individual attitudes towards various aspects of welfare state redistri-
bution (Gelissen 2000; Kangas 1997; Meier Jaeger 2006).
F. Roosma et al.: Perceptions of overuse and underuse of social benefits in Europe 3
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The argument regarding the self-interest of individuals claims that people in
lower structural positions (i.e., people with a lower income, education and/or
job status) have more positive attitudes towards welfare redistribution than
people in higher structural positions. In the literature, we find two such argu-
ments. Identification theory (Maassen and De Goede 1989) suggests that
because people in a lower structural position have a higher risk of becoming
dependent on welfare benefits, they are better able to identify with welfare reci-
pients. People who identify more strongly with beneficiaries perceive less inten-
tional overuse and more underuse because they can more readily recognize
people’s sense of shame in accepting benefits because of the stigmatization of
benefit recipients. By contrast, people in a higher structural position do not
easily identify with welfare recipients and therefore do not perceive underuse
as problematic, and the fact that they must contribute more to welfare redistri-
bution makes them more suspicious of potential overuse.
An alternative relationship between people’s structural position and percep-
tions of overuse and underuse is suggested by competition theory. Maassen
and de Goede (1989) argue that people who are at risk of becoming dependent
on benefits feel that they are in competition with welfare recipients. Being in a
lower structural position increases the fear that welfare abuse will jeopardize the
welfare system, and therefore overuse is viewed as a substantial problem. Mean-
while, underuse is not recognized as a major issue. People in a higher structural
position who do not feel or feel less of this competition for the scarce resources
of the welfare state would consequently perceive less overuse.
These arguments lead to two competing hypotheses:
H1: The lower the structural position of individuals, (a) the lower their per-
ception of overuse of benefits and the higher their perception of underuse or
(b) the higher their perception of overuse and the lower their perception of
underuse.
Second, regarding ideological affiliation, empirical studies indicate that people
with left-wing sympathies are in favour of a more generous redistribution (see,
for instance, Gelissen [2000]; Meier Jaeger [2006]). We believe that people with
left-wing political leanings who tend to favour a more generous redistribution
will perceive the current access to the welfare state as too strict (too difficult
to receive benefits) and will not see overuse as a problem. We assume that
people with right-wing sympathies, by contrast, perceive access to the welfare
state as too easy and perceive more overuse of benefits and little underuse.
Our second hypothesis reads as follows:
H2: People with stronger ideologically left-wing sympathies have lower per-
ceptions of overuse and higher perceptions of underuse.
Third, we hypothesize a relationship between overuse and underuse perceptions
and social and institutional trust. Trust in fellow citizens and in government insti-
tutions is important for the establishment of the social contract that is the foun-
dation for welfare state redistribution, and depends on whether people regard
4 Journal of European Public Policy
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other citizens and the state as trustworthy partners (Kahan 2005). A feedback effect
also seems likely: perceptions of the non-functioning of the contract as a result of,
for instance, perceived overuse and underuse may lead to erosion of the commit-
ment to the contract. Therefore, we expect trust and overuse and underuse percep-
tions to be related. Previous studies that focus on general welfare support find no
empirical link with institutional trust (Edlund 2006; Svallfors 1999, 2002), but
studies examining attitudes toward the procedural aspects of the welfare state
(including welfare fraud) do find associations with institutional trust (Edlund
1999, 2006; Svallfors 2002). We test the following hypothesis:
H3: The greater the interpersonal and institutional trust, the lower the per-
ceptions of overuse and underuse of welfare benefits.
2.2. Country-level explanations for overuse and underuse perceptions
Previous studies examining country-level effects on overuse and underuse per-
ceptions are scarce, and the sources of the (substantial) country-level variations
are not discussed (Edlund 1999; Ervasti 2012). An obvious contextual effect on
overuse and underuse perceptions would be actual abuse and non-take-up. If
there is a substantial amount of fraudulent behaviour of welfare recipients in
a country or if many people in need do not receive their financial support, indi-
viduals will notice that, not only at an individual level but also through country-
level mass communication by the government or the media. However, only a
couple of countries have data available on the actual overuse and underuse of
welfare benefits (Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands) (Hernanz
et al. 2004; Van Oorschot 1995), and only the United Kingdom regularly pro-
duces official estimates of benefit fraud and take-up rates (Department for Work
and Pensions [DWP] 2012a, 2012b). Moreover, the accuracy of these data has
been questioned (Frick and Groh-Samberg 2007; Hernanz et al. 2004; Kayser
and Frick 2000). This limited availability of incomparable data makes a com-
parative analysis impossible. We believe that because of the relative lack of avail-
able data, people are not aware of the actual facts about overuse and underuse of
benefits in their countries. Therefore, these actual figures might only marginally
influence perceptions of overuse and underuse via a country-level effect.
Nevertheless, people are constantly given examples of misuse or fraud by
welfare recipients. Negative images of beneficiaries play an increasingly impor-
tant role in political debates and the mass media (Bullock et al. 2001; Clawson
and Trice 2000; Larsen 2008; MacDonald et al. 2014; Sage 2012). We expect
that these collective images influence individual perceptions of welfare abuse in
particular. However, if the general idea in society is that welfare beneficiaries
misuse benefits, this idea could also affect perceptions of underuse. We formu-
late the following hypothesis.
H4: The stronger the collectively exposed idea that welfare beneficiaries take
advantage of the welfare state, the higher the perceived overuse and the lower
the perceived underuse.
F. Roosma et al.: Perceptions of overuse and underuse of social benefits in Europe 5
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In the welfare attitude literature, it is suggested that the economic situation, and
especially its effect on the unemployment rates in a country, can change welfare
state perceptions. Some scholars suggest that in situations of high unemploy-
ment, people consider welfare recipients to be more deserving because there is
a greater need for support (Sihvo and Uusitalo 1995b), and relying on benefits
is (partly) out of their individual control (Fridberg and Ploug 2000). Others
suggest that people feel more competition in times of economic hardship and
care more about their own situations (Durr 1993). Unfortunately, because we
rely only on cross-sectional data, we cannot test the effect of unemployment
rates over time. We formulate two competing hypotheses:
H5: The higher the unemployment in a country, (a) the lower the perceived
overuse and the higher the perceived underuse or (b) the higher the perceived
overuse and the lower the perceived underuse.
Finally, two main characteristics of the welfare state that are generally thought to
influence people’s welfare attitudes are the amount and manner of redistribution
(Esping-Andersen 1990). We argue that these characteristics also influence per-
ceptions of overuse and underuse. First, if the amount of social spending in a
country is low, people can develop the idea that benefits are underused
because they see that those in need do not receive enough benefit. High
social spending, by contrast, decreases perceptions of underuse because people
see fewer people in need. However, high social spending in a country may
also strengthen the individuals’ perceptions that public money is wasted on
beneficiaries, which, following the same line of reasoning, leads to stronger
perceptions of overuse.
H6: The higher social spending in a country, the higher the perceived overuse
and the lower the perceived underuse.
Considering the manner of redistribution by welfare states, one could argue that
in countries with more selective benefit schemes, such as the Anglo Saxon
welfare regime (Esping-Andersen 1990), where beneficiaries must fulfil more
criteria to be eligible for a benefit (for instance, concerning means testing,
strict work records and job search requirements), people might be more con-
cerned about underuse of benefits because they perceive that it is difficult to
become eligible for benefits. Simultaneously, people may identify a lower risk
of overuse because the actual access to benefits is very strict. By contrast, in
countries that are characterized by universal benefit schemes, such as the
Social-Democratic welfare regime, people may see less underuse of benefits
and more overuse because it may generally be easier for people who do not
need benefits to obtain them. However, contrary to these presupposed effects
on overuse and underuse perceptions, several studies argue that people in
Anglo Saxon countries are actually more suspicious of the overuse of benefits
(Edlund 1999; Rothstein 1998; Svallfors 1991). When welfare states use
more criteria to select eligible claimants, there are more rules that can be
broken, and people may paradoxically perceive more overuse in general. In
6 Journal of European Public Policy
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other words, in welfare regimes that rely more on selective benefits, people may
be more focused on the potential abuse or misuse of benefits because they per-
ceive that more rules may leave more room for cheating. By contrast, in welfare
regimes with more accessible benefit schemes, such as in universal welfare states,
these concerns may be less important because there is less need to be suspicious
of potential misuse when many citizens are included in such schemes (Rothstein
1998). We therefore formulate the following hypothesis:
H7: In welfare regimes with historically more selective social policies (as
opposed to more universal social policies), perceived overuse is higher and
perceived underuse is lower.
3. DATA AND METHODS
3.1. Data
To test our hypotheses, we use data from the European Social Survey, round 4,
2008/9.1 This survey provides an extended module on welfare state attitudes.
From the 29 participating countries, we selected 25 European countries (N
¼ 47,489): Belgium (BE); Bulgaria (BG); Switzerland (CH); Cyprus (CY);
the Czech Republic (CZ); Germany (DE); Denmark (DK); Estonia (EE);
Spain (ES); Finland (FI); France (FR); the United Kingdom (GB); Greece
(GR); Croatia (HR); Hungary (HU); Ireland (IE); Latvia (LV); the Netherlands
(NL); Norway (NO); Poland (PL); Portugal (PT); Romania (RO); Sweden
(SE); Slovenia (SI); and Slovakia (SK). The survey items were presented in
the context of opinions about the welfare state. We use three items as indicators
of overuse perceptions (‘people are not trying to find a job’, ‘obtaining benefits
for which they are not entitled’, and ‘not working and pretending to be sick’)
and two items that measure perceptions of underuse (‘people get less benefits
than they are entitled to’ and ‘there are insufficient benefits for people in
need’).2 Table 1 provides the wording of the survey questions. All items are
measured on a five-point scale with higher scores indicating stronger perceptions
of overuse and underuse. Using three items to measure the latent concept of per-
ceived overuse allows us to test the measurement invariance of this concept
across countries. We found partial scalar measurement equivalence, which indi-
cates that the items measure the same concept (perceived overuse) for all the
selected countries.3 Because we have only two items for underuse, we could
not assess its measurement invariance, but we did find a similar measurement
construct for all countries by employing principal component analyses. We
computed a scale for both overuse and underuse by adding the scores on the
indicators and dividing it by the number of items.
We include three variables for structural position: (1) an individual’s house-
hold income, which is measured on a 10-point scale (individuals were able to
report their weekly, monthly or annual income); (2) work status measured as
dummy variables in answer to the question ‘what have you been doing for
the last seven days?’ (paid work (reference category), unemployed (both actively
F. Roosma et al.: Perceptions of overuse and underuse of social benefits in Europe 7
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and not actively looking for a job), retired, permanently sick or disabled, and other
not in the workforce); and (3) dummy variables for educational levels ((less than)
primary education (reference category), lower secondary education, higher second-
ary education and tertiary education). For ideological position, we use the left/
right self-placement scale (a 10-point scale with higher scores indicating a more
right-wing position). For interpersonal trust, we computed a means scale out
of three variables (scale 0–10) according to the following: ‘would you say
that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing
with people?’; ‘do you think that most people would try to take advantage of
you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?’; and ‘would you say
that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking
out for themselves?’. These items have an average scale reliability coefficient
(alpha) of 0.745 (with a standard deviation of 0.057) across the 25 countries.
For institutional trust, we computed a means scale of five variables (scale 0–
10): ‘how much you personally trust each of these institutions: parliament,
the legal system, the police, politicians, and political parties?’. This scale has
an average scale reliability coefficient (alpha) of 0.865 (with a standard deviation
of 0.024). Finally, we add two control variables: gender (reference category:
male) and age in years (younger than 30 (reference category), 31–45 years,
46–65 years and older than 65).
For the contextual-level measures, for the collective image of welfare recipients,
we use an aggregated measure of the item ‘welfare makes people lazy’. We need
to rely on this indirect measure because, unfortunately, no direct measures of
Table 1 Operationalization and descriptive statistics: overuse and underuse (N ¼
47489)
Scale 1 – 5.
% (strongly)
agree
% (strongly)
disagree Mean St. dev.
Overuse (scale) 3.228 0.776
Most unemployed do not really try
to find a job
39 38 3.034 1.104
Many people manage to obtain
benefits and services to which
they are not entitled
64 16 3.620 0.957
Employees often pretend that they
are sick in order to stay home
38 36 3.029 1.071
Underuse (scale) 3.498 0.823
Many people with very low
incomes get less benefits than
they are legally entitled to
52 21 3.394 0.973
There are insufficient benefits in
[country] to help the people who
are in real need
63 19 3.603 1.021
8 Journal of European Public Policy
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images of moral hazard related to welfare were available in the mass media. For
the unemployment rate, we use Eurostat data from 20084 measuring the number
of unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force. For social spending,
we use the amount of expenditure on social protection as a percentage of GDP
from Eurostat for 2008 (which has a high correlation with expenditures in pre-
vious years). For the measurement of universal and selective regime types, we use
dummies for the Anglo Saxon countries (IE and GB) as the most selective regime
type and for the Scandinavian countries (DK, FI, NO, and SE) as the most uni-
versal regime type (Esping-Andersen 1990). We expect the Conservative (CH,
BE, DE, FR, NL), the Post-Communist (BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LV, PL,
RO, SK, SI) and Mediterranean (CY, ES, GR, PT) welfare regimes to be in
the middle range from universal to selective regimes. We use the Conservative
regime as a reference category.
3.2. Methods
To test our hypotheses, we employ multilevel regression analyses by testing a
random intercept model in which the intercept varies across countries (Hox
2010). We include covariates to explain the variation at the individual and
country levels. We cannot include many covariates at the country level
because our effective sample size at the country level is only 25 countries. We
present the proportion of reduced variance at the lower part of the tables (Rau-
denbush et al. 2002). We use the program Stata 13.
Unfortunately, household income and left/right self-placement have a con-
siderably high level of missing data (21 and 14 per cent respectively). To
avoid biased estimates, we opt for the multiple imputations approach in
which missing data are imputed according to the chained equations imputation
procedure that creates multiple imputed data sets, taking into account the clus-
tered structure of the data (Allison 2001).
4. RESULTS
4.1. Descriptive results
A strong majority (64 per cent) of Europeans believes that many people inten-
tionally overuse (abuse) welfare benefits. Perceptions related to aspects of
overuse that we called the misuse of benefits (i.e., people who are not truly
looking for a job or people who are pretending to be sick) are less negative:
the European public seems divided on that issue. Regarding the underuse of
benefits, the majority (63 per cent) of Europeans has a strong impression that
the level of benefits available to help people who are deserving of welfare
support is insufficient. Moreover, a majority (52 per cent) believes that many
people who are entitled to benefits do not actually receive these benefits.
People thus perceive high degrees of both overuse and underuse of benefits,
which confirms the results of previous research.
F. Roosma et al.: Perceptions of overuse and underuse of social benefits in Europe 9
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When we examine the mean scores for the overuse and underuse scale for the
selected countries in Figure 1, we observe that in Denmark and Sweden percep-
tions of both overuse and underuse are well below the European means. Fur-
thermore, in Norway, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Germany perceptions
of overuse and underuse are substantially lower than average. In the upper-
right corner (indicating strong perceptions of overuse and underuse), we find
the Post-Communist countries and Mediterranean countries. Countries that
have high perceptions of overuse but low perceptions of underuse are the
Anglo Saxon countries, Belgium, the Czech Republic and Cyprus. Countries
in the Baltic region (including Finland) perceive low overuse of benefits but
high underuse. We do not have a specific explanation for this result.
4.2. Multilevel models of overuse and underuse perceptions
Table 2 (overuse) and Table 3 (underuse) show the results of the multilevel
regression analyses. In Models 1–3, we included the individual-level covariates.
In Models 4–7, we add the contextual factors. The intercept-only model
(Model 0) reveals that the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) for overuse
is modest (0.096), while the ICC for underuse is nearly twice as high
(0.171), indicating that there is more country-level variation in perceptions of
underuse than in perceptions of overuse. The variance components in Model
Figure 1 Mean scores for overuse and underuse by country
Note: Lines indicate the overall mean.
10 Journal of European Public Policy
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Table 2 Multilevel models – overuse
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Intercept 3.235∗∗∗ 3.446∗∗∗ 3.326∗∗∗ 3.593∗∗∗ 2.430∗∗∗ 3.486∗∗∗ 3.671∗∗∗ 3.545∗∗∗
Individual-level covariates
Income –0.003 –0.005∗∗ –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 –0.001
Job status (paid work is ref. cat.)
† In education –0.108∗∗∗ –0.101∗∗∗ –0.068∗∗∗ –0.068∗∗∗ –0.068∗∗∗ –0.068∗∗∗ –0.068∗∗∗
† Unemployed (active) –0.194∗∗∗ –0.186∗∗∗ –0.202∗∗∗ –0.202∗∗∗ –0.202∗∗∗ –0.202∗∗∗ –0.202∗∗∗
† Unemployed (not active) –0.175∗∗∗ –0.173∗∗∗ –0.176∗∗∗ –0.176∗∗∗ –0.176∗∗∗ –0.176∗∗∗ –0.176∗∗∗
† Disabled –0.045∗∗ –0.037∗ –0.062∗∗ –0.062∗∗ –0.062∗∗ –0.062∗∗ –0.062∗∗
† Retired 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004
† Other –0.016∗ –0.017∗ –0.012 –0.012 –0.012 –0.012 –0.012
Education (primary is ref. cat.)
† Lower sec. education –0.021 –0.019 –0.018 –0.018 –0.018 –0.018 –0.017
† Higher sec. education –0.073∗∗∗ –0.071∗∗∗ –0.066∗∗∗ –0.066∗∗∗ –0.065∗∗∗ –0.066∗∗∗ –0.065∗∗∗
† Tertiary education –0.262∗∗∗ –0.255∗∗∗ –0.227∗∗∗ –0.227∗∗∗ –0.226∗∗∗ –0.227∗∗∗ –0.226∗∗∗
Left/right self-placement 0.038∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
Interpersonal trust –0.042∗∗∗ –0.043∗∗∗ –0.042∗∗∗ –0.042∗∗∗ –0.042∗∗∗
Institutional trust –0.039∗∗∗ –0.039∗∗∗ –0.039∗∗∗ –0.039∗∗∗ –0.039∗∗∗
Age (18–35 is ref. cat.)
† Age 35–45 –0.078∗∗∗ –0.079∗∗∗ –0.080∗∗∗ –0.080∗∗∗ –0.080∗∗∗ –0.080∗∗∗ –0.080∗∗∗
† Age 45–65 –0.126∗∗∗ –0.122∗∗∗ –0.118∗∗∗ –0.118∗∗∗ –0.120∗∗∗ –0.120∗∗∗ –0.118∗∗∗
† Age 65+ –0.035∗ –0.042∗∗ –0.019 –0.020 –0.019 –0.019 –0.020
Female (male is ref. cat.) 0.007 –0.004 –0.000 –0.000 –0.000 –0.000 –0.000
(Continued)
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Table 2 Continued
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Country-level covariates
Collective image welfare
recipient
0.383∗∗∗
Unemployment rate 0.017
Social spending as % GDP –0.003
Welfare regime (conservative is
ref. cat.)
† Scandinavian –0.183∗
† Anglo Saxon 0.347∗∗
† Post-Communist 0.079
† Mediterranean 0.100
Variance components
Group 0.058 0.055 0.055 0.039 0.026 0.038 0.039 0.022
Residuals 0.549 0.536 0.529 0.515 0.515 0.515 0.515 0.515
% Group variance explained 5.17 5.17 32.76 55.09 34.42 32.75 62.07
% Residual variance explained 2.37 3.64 6.19 6.19 6.19 6.19 6.19
Notes: Number of observations: 47,489.
Number of groups: 25.
Number of imputed data sets: 5.
∗p , 0.05; ∗∗p , 0.01; ∗∗∗p , 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
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Table 3 Multilevel models – underuse
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Intercept 3.489∗∗∗ 3.741∗∗∗ 3.851∗∗∗ 4.124∗∗∗ 4.568∗∗∗ 3.692∗∗∗ 4.762∗∗∗ 3.863∗∗∗
Individual-level covariates
Income –0.026∗∗∗ –0.025∗∗∗ –0.022∗∗∗ –0.022∗∗∗ –0.022∗∗ –0.022∗∗ –0.022∗∗
Job status (paid work is ref.
cat.)
† In education –0.071∗∗∗ –0.075∗∗∗ –0.045∗∗∗ –0.043∗∗ –0.043∗∗ –0.043∗∗ –0.043∗∗
† Unemployed (active) 0.080∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
† Unemployed (not active) 0.044∗ 0.043∗ 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037
† Disabled 0.098∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
† Retired –0.024∗ –0.024∗ –0.022∗ –0.024∗ –0.024∗ –0.024∗ –0.024∗
† Other –0.012 –0.011 –0.006 –0.007 –0.006 –0.007 –0.007
Education (primary is ref.cat.)
† Lower sec. education –0.047∗∗ –0.048∗∗∗ –0.048∗∗∗ –0.048∗∗∗ –0.047∗∗∗ –0.048∗∗∗ –0.048∗∗∗
† Higher sec. education –0.086∗∗∗ –0.087∗∗∗ –0.086∗∗∗ –0.085∗∗∗ –0.085∗∗∗ –0.086∗∗∗ –0.085∗∗∗
† Tertiary education –0.223∗∗∗ –0.226∗∗∗ –0.205∗∗∗ –0.203∗∗∗ –0.203∗∗∗ –0.204∗∗∗ –0.203∗∗∗
Left/right self-placement –0.023∗∗∗ –0.020∗∗∗ –0.019∗∗∗ –0.019∗∗∗ –0.019∗∗∗ –0.019∗∗∗
Interpersonal trust –0.020∗∗∗ –0.020∗∗∗ –0.020∗∗∗ –0.020∗∗∗ –0.020∗∗∗
Institutional trust –0.050∗∗∗ –0.050∗∗∗ –0.050∗∗∗ –0.050∗∗∗ –0.050∗∗∗
Age (18–35 is ref. cat.)
† Age 35–45 –0.029∗∗ –0.028∗∗ –0.028∗∗ –0.028∗∗ –0.029∗∗ –0.028∗∗ –0.028∗∗
† Age 45–65 –0.012 –0.015 –0.013 –0.012 –0.012 –0.012 –0.012
† Age 65+ –0.042∗ –0.037∗ –0.019 –0.019 –0.019 –0.019 –0.019
Female (male is ref. cat.) 0.046∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(Continued)
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Table 3 Continued
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Country-level covariates
Collective image welfare
recipient
–0.146
Unemployment rate 0.070∗∗
Social spending as % GDP –0.028∗∗∗
Welfare regime (conservative is
ref.cat.)
† Scandinavian 0.053
† Anglo Saxon 0.139
† Post-Communist .0425∗∗∗
† Mediterranean 0.440∗∗∗
Variance components
Group 0.116 0.107 0.107 0.076 0.073 0.054 0.053 0.038
Residuals 0.562 0.547 0.544 0.533 0.533 0.533 0.533 0.533
% Group variance explained 7.76 7.76 34.48 37.07 54.85 54.31 67.24
% Residual variance explained 2.67 3.20 5.16 5.16 .516 5.16 5.16
Notes: Number of observations: 47,489.
Number of groups: 25.
Number of imputed data sets: 5.
∗p , 0.05; ∗∗p , 0.01; ∗∗∗p , 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
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3 (including all individual-level covariates) show that the country-level variation
of overuse and of underuse is approximately one-third explained by a compo-
sition effect related to individuals in the Eastern and Southern European
countries who have lower trust levels and lower structural positions.
In particular, people who have lower incomes or who are unemployed or dis-
abled perceive greater underuse, while people with paid work perceive more
overuse of benefits. There is no significant effect of income on the perceptions
of overuse. These results support hypothesis H1a and identification theory
rather than competition theory (H1b): people in lower structural positions
can better identify with people who are dependent on welfare benefits and there-
fore perceive less overuse and more underuse, whereas people in paid work view
underuse as less of a problem and perceive greater overuse, likely because they
must contribute more to the welfare state.
However, when we examine the effect for education, held constant for other
socio-economic factors, we observe that having a higher education increases the
probability of perceiving both low overuse and low underuse. We suggest that
this specific effect of education might be explained by the tendency of highly
educated people to be more informed about government efforts to prevent
fraud and increase benefit take-up.
The results for the hypothesized effects of political affiliation confirm hypoth-
esis H2. People with more right-wing views perceive more overuse of benefits
and less underuse, while people with left-wing views perceive less overuse and
more underuse. These effects for ideological affiliation are consistent with the
results found in previous research (Ervasti 1998, 2012; Halvorsen 2002;
Sihvo and Uusitalo 1995a; Van Oorschot and Meuleman 2011).
Considering hypothesis H3, we observe substantial expected effects of trust
on perceptions of mis-targeting. Both interpersonal and institutional trust
explain a substantial part of the variance. People who are trusting are more opti-
mistic about the redistribution process in general and about good targeting in
particular. Trust in institutions in general is related to trust in the targeting
of benefits to deserving recipients.
Examining the country-level covariates, we observe in Model 4 that people
perceive greater overuse of benefits in countries where the collective image of
welfare recipients is negative. Interestingly, there is no effect on underuse per-
ceptions, which suggests that underuse perceptions are less influenced by politi-
cal or public debates. We explain this result by recalling that the argument that
an overly generous welfare state leads to the misuse of welfare benefits is often
used by ideological opponents of the welfare state in public and political
debates, whereas the possible underuse of benefits does not play a substantial
role for either right- or left-wing advocates. As a result, perceptions of
overuse may be more politicized and may have effects at both the individual
and collective levels.
Remarkably, a country’s unemployment rate affects only underuse percep-
tions: higher unemployment leads to higher perceived underuse. Because this
test is only a cross-sectional test, we cannot draw strong conclusions about
F. Roosma et al.: Perceptions of overuse and underuse of social benefits in
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these effects. However, in countries with more difficult economic situations,
people care more about the underuse of benefits. This tendency may explain
why we find higher levels of underuse perceptions in Eastern and Southern
Europe. We thus find partial support for hypothesis H5a.
Model 6 shows that low social spending in a country is associated with the
perception of underuse of benefits, most likely because people perceive that
those in need do not receive what they deserve. However, there is no evidence
for the hypothesis that social spending increases the perception of overuse based
on the idea that tax money is being wasted. We can thus only partly confirm
hypothesis H6.
The redistribution strategy in welfare states seems to affect perceptions of mis-
targeting more substantially. In particular, the Anglo Saxon welfare regime is the
most strongly associated with overuse perceptions. This finding supports
hypothesis H7, which argues that more selective welfare regimes are associated
with perceptions of greater overuse of benefits: when welfare states create a great
deal of criteria for citizens to be eligible for benefits, people tend to be more sus-
picious of benefit recipients. We observe that universal or selective welfare
regimes do not significantly affect perceptions of underuse. An effect was
observed for the Post-Communist and Mediterranean regimes, but we assume
that this effect is primarily caused by the economic situation in these countries.
5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Rothstein (1998) argues that for the welfare state to be legitimate, people must
believe that welfare policies are implemented efficiently (with low administrative
costs) and effectively (without welfare fraud). We found that Europeans not
only strongly perceive abuse and misuse of benefits but also perceive substantial
underuse of benefits. Especially in the Southern and Eastern European
countries, underuse perceptions are strong. Regarding overuse perceptions,
the Anglo Saxon countries stand out as countries with high average levels of sus-
piciousness of benefit abuse. Although support for welfare policies is generally
strong, perceptions of welfare abuse of non-take-up still undermine the legiti-
macy of the welfare state.
Our analysis shows that although they can be viewed as two manifestations of
the same problem of mis-targeting of benefits, overuse and underuse are two
rather different dimensions of welfare attitudes: they are influenced by different
factors. Perceptions of overuse strongly depend on political factors. The threat
of overuse of welfare benefits is often used as a political argument against (more)
government redistribution. In addition to the individual effect of right-wing
ideology, we observe this effect especially on the contextual level, where the col-
lective public image of welfare recipients influences individual perceptions of
benefit abuse. Moreover, in welfare regimes that rely more heavily on selective
benefits, where the state exerts more effort in determining whether benefit clai-
mants are truly deserving of benefits, there is more focus on possible abuse or
misuse of benefits compared with welfare regimes that rely on more universal
16 Journal of European Public Policy
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [K
U 
Le
uv
en
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
5:2
5 0
8 M
ay
 20
15
 
benefit schemes. We believe that public and political debates on the potential
misuse of welfare beneficiaries also contribute to the tendency to define target
groups more specifically and to make benefits more selective, which can in
turn result in stronger perceptions of misuse. This interplay between selective
welfare regimes and negative images of welfare recipients in public debates
leads to higher levels of perceived welfare abuse and undermines the legitimacy
of the welfare state.
By contrast, we observe that underuse perceptions depend more on
people’s direct experiences with the welfare state and with welfare claimants.
On the individual level, we find that self-interest and identification play an
important role. When people face the risk of becoming dependent on
welfare benefits, they are more concerned with the underuse of benefits.
On a contextual level, we observe the positive influence of the level of unem-
ployment and the negative influence of the amount of social spending in a
country. Perceptions of underuse are thus more determined by socioeconomic
circumstances, in terms of both the economic situation and the generosity of
the state itself.
Another indication that overuse and underuse are two different dimensions of
welfare attitudes is that several effects of covariates are in opposite directions (for
work status and political affiliation), while some effects are in the same direction
(for education and trust). Moreover, previous research shows a weak association
between overuse and underuse perceptions (Ervasti 2012; Roosma et al. 2013;
Sihvo and Uusitalo 1995a). Thus, the question of how overuse and underuse
perceptions are combined within individuals should be addressed in further
research.
Unfortunately, because of the relatively low number of countries, we were not
able to include multiple covariates on the contextual level. This limitation
restricted us in exploring the contextual mechanisms in more detail. Addition-
ally, the unavailability of data on the actual overuse and underuse of benefits was
a gap in our research design. However, because such specific information is not
publicly available to the general public, we expect only a small contextual-level
effect on overuse and underuse perceptions.
We examined the degree to which one of the conditions of welfare state legiti-
macy, procedural justice, is met by European welfare states. It is fair to state that
in all European countries, not only are overuse perceptions strong and con-
sidered a potential threat to welfare state legitimacy, but underuse perceptions
are also significant. These two perceptions emerge as two different dimensions
of welfare state legitimacy influenced by different individual and country
characteristics. Hence, instead of one Achilles’ heel, welfare state legitimacy
has two weak spots.
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NOTES
1 See http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/.
2 The term ‘insufficient benefits’ can be interpreted as ‘inadequate benefits’ or as
‘benefits that are lacking’. In the latter case, it can be discussed whether this item
measures support for more benefit schemes in general instead of mis-targeting.
The correlation of this item with support for the role of government, however, is sub-
stantially smaller than the correlation with the other underuse item. We argue that
this item is therefore suitable for measuring underuse perceptions.
3 The results of these measurement equivalence analyses are available from the first
author.
4 See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data.
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